



STORK PRESENTATION

**Challenges of eID interoperability:
What we learn(ed) from the STORK journey?**

Primelife Summerschool, Helsingborg, 3.8.2010

Herbert.Leitold@egiz.gv.at



- eID motivation, a little history
- STORK Project Environment
- Interoperability Models and Integration
- Technology

ID - what if something goes wrong ...

- Digital twins, identity theft, ...

THEATRE NEWS

What's in a name?

10:55am Thursday 25th February 2010

Print Email Share

IDENTITY theft is no joke – the government puts the cost of this particular type of fraud at between £1.5 and £1.7 billion a year.

And Canadian Bennett Aaron, himself a victim of stolen identity, manages to see the funny side. "It Wasn't Me, It Was Bennett," he says, "the series of bizarre experiences that over the course of a decade, left him homeless, penniless and resulted in a jail sentence."

"The last thing I expected was to do a comedy show about it," explains Bennett. "I was about to buy my first home, and then I received a letter from the bank saying I'd discovered I had huge debts and couldn't pay them."




KLEINE ZEITUNG

Zuletzt aktualisiert: 20.02.2010 um 05:48 Uhr [\(2 Kommentare\)](#)

Ein Datenzwilling wider Willen

ein virtueller Datenzwilling kostete Thomas Huber reale Nerven.



Claim 1: There is a case for quality (e)ID



Government eID projects ...

- Early birds started late 1990's early 2000



Finish eID card:

December 1999



— Estonian eID card: from January 2002



Austrian citizen card: from 2003, mass-rollouts 2005



Italian CIE / CNS: test phase 2003 (CIE)



— Belgian eID card:

from 2nd half 2003



Government eID projects ...

- Early birds started late 1990's early 2000



Finish eID card:

December 1997



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Italian CIE / CIS: test phase 2003 (CIE)



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Evolved as
national islands

National eIDs landscape

- Heterogeneous in various dimensions

- Technology

- Smartcards: AT, BE, EE, ES, FI, GE, IT, PT, SE, ...
 - Mobile eID: AT, EE, FI, LU, NL, NO, UK, ...
 - Soft certif.: ES, SE, SI, ...
 - usern./pass.: NL, UK, ...

- Operational

- Issued by public sector, private sector, combined
 - Issued at federal, local, regional level



Claim 2: None is the “better” system, they’re just different

Cross-border cases

- A few examples ...
 - Student mobility
 - Migrant workers
 - E-Health
 - Services Directive
 - Moving house
 - Social security ...



Claim 3: There is a case for cross-border eID


A little history: eID ad-hoc-group (2004-2005)

... discussed the identifier models of MS


FLAT MODEL



SECTORAL MODEL



SEPARATED MODEL




A European eID model must coexist with all three models not :: compromising privacy

eID MUST NOT ADD ADDITIONAL PRIVACY RISKS TO EXISTING APPLICATIONS


A little history: eID ad hoc-group (2004-2005)

... discussed possible interoperability models



A little history: eID ad hoc-group (2004-2005)

... developed signposts with a roadmap



By 2010 European citizens and businesses shall be able to benefit from secure means of electronic identification that maximise user convenience while respecting data protection regulations.

Such means shall be made available under the responsibility of the Member States but recognised across the EU

eIDs in STORK *(those piloting in 1st phase)*


Country & sec. level		Token Types			Relation to 1999/93/EC		Token Issuer	
	# of cred.	Smart card	mobile eID	soft.-certif.	qualified cert (signature-cert)	is a SSCD	public sector	private sector
Austria	3	yes	yes	-	all	all	yes	yes (<i>all. qual.c.</i>)
Belgium	1	yes	-	-	all	all	yes	-
Estonia	2	yes	yes	-	all	all	yes	-
Germany	1	yes	-	-	optional	all	yes	(<i>opt. qual.certs.</i>)
Iceland	2	yes	-	-	all	all	-	yes
Italy	2	yes	-	-	all	all	yes	yes (sig.-card)
Luxembourg	3	yes	yes	-	all	all	-	yes
Portugal	1	yes	-	-	all	all	yes	-
Slovenia	3	yes	-	yes	all	yes (QAA 4)	yes	yes
Spain	1+80	yes	-	yes	yes (QAA 3-4)	yes (QAA 4)	yes (QAA 3-4)	yes (QAA 3-4)
Sweden	12+	yes	-	yes	-	<i>tbc</i>	yes	yes




eID motivation, a little history

- STORK Project Environment
- Interoperability Models and Integration
- Technology

eGovernment objectives (ICT-PSP call 2007)



STORK – Member State involvement



Member States/EEA – STORK

Member States Ref Group

STORK-2 (original plan)


- Member States have eID projects
 - planned, deploying, or operational
- Heterogenous environment
 - Technology: smartcards, username/passwords
 - Operational: e.g. centralized, decentralized
 - Legal: e.g. persistent identifiers, sector-specific IDs
- STORK does not change the MS situation, but aims at interoperability on top of it

Issues to be tackled

- Consensus needed
- Legal
 - e.g. MS limit use of national identifiers
 - can prohibit using the identifier cross-border
- Data protection
 - Processing needs to be legitimate
- Liability
 - What if something goes wrong?
- Trust
 - MoUs, Accreditation, self-assessment ??



Project's structure



STORK – Roadmap “the way ahead”

Feb 09

Oct 09

May10


May11



Framework mapping
Legal interoperability
priority technologies



Quality authenticator scheme
eID PROCESS FLOWS



Common, SAML 2.0 - based
specifications have been agreed
by the STORK consortium

Functional
Design

Technical
Design

Construction &
Implementation

Exploitation - Pilots

Evaluation



Assessment on common
specifications on eID



Cross-border authentication platform

Pilots



Pilot 1 – Cross border authentication



Pilot 2 – safer chat



Pilot 3 – eID Student Mobility



Pilot 4 – eID electronic delivery



Pilot 5 – EU Citizen Change of Address


Further services



- A2A services as additional deployments
 - ✓ Defined as part of the work programme
 - ✓ First focused on specific applications, but ...
- Integration with ECAS
 - ✓ Obvious option for doing the A2A services with EC
 - ✓ Demonstrator as a first step
- Establishing as a full STORK pilot (the 6th pilot)

- ✓ eID motivation, a little history
- ✓ STORK Project Environment
 - Interoperability Models and Integration
 - Technology


One problem tackled: Trust levels



Different technologies and security levels:

- Smart cards
- Software certificates
- Mobile Phones
- Username-password

Approach: Mapping to QAA levels



STORK assumes the citizen has online-access with eID.

Four use cases:

1. **Authentication:** in an online access to a service provider
2. **Attribute Transfer**
 - STORK defines *eID* as the *identifier* (e.g. national citizen ID),
 - “the rest” (name, date of birth, qualification, ...) are *attributes*
3. **Attribute Verification:** is a certain attribute presented by the citizen correct?
4. **Certificate Verification:** for electronic signatures

One Interoperability Framework, Two Basic Models

STORK will investigate and pilot two interoperability models:

1. **Middleware (MW)**
2. **Pan-European Proxy Services (PEPS)**

.. and combine them ($MW \Rightarrow MW$, $PEPS \Rightarrow PEPS$, $MW \Rightarrow PEPS$, $PEPS \Rightarrow MW$)

The common specifications have been designed so that major components operate on the same protocols, irrespective of the model or its combinations.

STORK – High Level Architectural Approach 1




Integration at the Service Provider with smart-cards as means of eID




Middleware



STORK – Example of Middleware Architectures




STORK – Communalities: Middleware Concept




STORK – Making Governments to co-operate



STORK PEPS data flow (logical)




Protocol: Federated Identity (SAML 2.0)



The “combination hat trick” V-IDP

Virtual Identity Provider

- provide a MW access at a PEPS or
- a PEPS interface at the SPware




STORK – Middleware Interoperability Model

MW \Rightarrow MW example: Austrian student at German University



STORK – PEPS Interoperability Model


PEPS example: Swedish student at UK university



STORK – combined model

MW ⇒ PEPS example: Austrian student at Swedish university,

“Virtual IDP” concept



General considerations

■ Middleware

- No intermediaries between user & SP
 - SP remains data controller
- Needs to integrate all tokens (pure model)
- End-to-end security

■ PEPS

- Third party
 - Liability shift
 - Data processor or data controller
- Hides national complexity
- Segmented trust-relationships


In both cases consent as basis for data processing legitimacy

Integration model “PEPS country”


Service providers



STORK Layer (centralized)



Foreign eID



middleware




Integration model “MW country”

Service providers

STORK Layer (decentralized)

Foreign eID




middleware

PEPS




- ✓ eID motivation, a little history
- ✓ STORK Project Environment
- ✓ Interoperability Models and Integration
 - Technology

Case 1: Service Provider in PEPS State




Case 2: Service Provider in MW State



STORK – Process Flow PEPS-PEPS Authentication

Authentication Process Flow: WP4.1 Diagram A


MS A Resident, Identity Provider and PEPS in MS A, Service Provider and PEPS in MS B



STORK – Process Flow PEPS-PEPS MS-specific

Member State Specific Identification Phase WP 4.1 Diagram B


MS A Resident, Identity Provider and PEPS in MS A, Service Provider and PEPS in MS B



STORK – Process Flow MW-PEPS Authentication

Authentication Process Flow: WP4.1 Diagram C


MS A Resident, Middleware from MS A, Service Provider and PEPS in MS B



STORK – Process Flow PEPS Attribute Transfer

Attribute Transfer Process Flow: WP4.3 Diagram D


Identity Provider and PEPS in MS A with PEPS and Service Provider in MS B




STORK – Process Flow MW-PEPS Attribute Transf.

Authentication Process Flow: WP4.1 Diagram C

MS A Resident, Middleware from MS A, Service Provider and PEPS in MS B




Common MW architecture




MARS

PEPS Architecture



- XML-based standard for exchanging authentication and authorization data between security domains
- Typical Use Cases:
 - ✓ Web Single Sign-On (SSO)
 - ✓ Identity Federation
 - ✓ Attribute-Based Authorization
 - ✓ Securing Web Services


SAML architecture



Source: SAML 2.0 Technical Overview

SAML example


■ SAML via SOAP over HTTP



```
1: <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
2: <env:Envelope xmlns:env="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/envelope/">
3:   <env:Body>
4:     <samlp:Response
5:       xmlns:samlp="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:protocol"
6:       xmlns:saml="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:assertion"
7:       Version="2.0"
8:       ID="i92f8b5230dc04d73e93095719d191915fdc67d5e"
9:       IssueInstant="2006-07-17T20:31:41Z"
10:      InResponseTo="aaf23196-1773-2113-474a-fell14412ab72 ">
11:       <saml:Issuer>http://idp.example.org</saml:Issuer>
12:       <samlp:Status>
13:         <samlp:StatusCode Value="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:status:Success"/>
14:       </samlp:Status>
15:       ...SAML assertion...
16:     </samlp:Response>
17:   </env:Body>
18: </env:Envelope>
```

Source: SAML 2.0 Technical Overview

SAML and STORK



PEPS – Environment and Frameworks

- Linux/Windows
- Java 1.5
- Application Servers – Web application
 - ✓ Tomcat 5/6
 - ✓ JBoss 5
 - ✓ Glassfish V3
- Frameworks:
 - ✓ Spring
 - ✓ Struts
 - ✓ OpenSAML
 - ✓ log4j

VIDP – Environment and Frameworks

- Linux/Windows
- Java 1.5
- Application Servers – Enterprise application
 - ✓ Glassfish V2
- Frameworks:
 - ✓ EJB
 - ✓ Velocity (Web presentation, JSP)
 - ✓ OpenSAML
 - ✓ slf4j/log4j
 - ✓ JAXB/JAX-WS

Presentation Overview

- ✓ eID motivation, a little history
- ✓ STORK Project Environment
- ✓ Interoperability Models and Integration
- ✓ Technology

Key Action 3: In 2011 propose a revision of the **eSignature Directive** with a view to provide a legal framework for cross-border recognition and interoperability of **secure eAuthentication systems**;

Key Action 16: Propose by 2012 a **Council and Parliament Decision** to ensure **mutual recognition of e-identification and e-authentication** across the EU based on online 'authentication services' to be offered in all Member States (which may use the most appropriate official citizen documents – issued by the public or the private sector);

Conclusions

TUGRAZonline Anmeldung - TUGRAZonline - Technische Universität Graz - Windows Internet Explorer

https://online.tugraz.at/tug_online/webnav.ini

Datei Bearbeiten Ansicht Favoriten Extras ?

Aktuelles Mein Amtshelfer Meine Bürgerkarte Mein Bundesland Sicher im Internet Top Anwendungen Mein Österreich

Favoriten Vorgeschlagene Sites Web Slice-Katalog

TUGRAZonline Anmeldung - TUGRAZonline - Te...

TUGrazonline

Suche

Hier an/abmelden!

Technische Universität Graz

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- Serviceeinrichtungen
- Beteiligungen
- Initiativen
- Vertretungen der TU Graz-Angehörigen
- Alumni

TU Graz AnmeldeSystem

Anmeldung mit Benutzername/Kennwort

Benutzername

Kennwort

Anmeldung

Anmeldung mit Bürgerkarte

Bürgerkarte

Online BKU

Mobile BKU

Lokale BKU


European eID

Hierfür wird eine lokale Bürgerkarten-umgebung benötigt.

Internet | Geschützter Modus: Aktiv

100%

STORK – eID interoperability



THANK YOU FOR YOUR ATTENTION

info@eid-stork.eu