HOT is a made-up short for the Swedish project name ‘Hoppet till Tor’, roughly translatable to ‘The hope/jump to Tor’. The project focused on the first connection from a user’s... Read more »

For our work on the effect of DNS on Tor’s anonymity we collected a significantly sized DNS dataset with five samples each from the Alexa top one million most popular... Read more »

We’ve developed a padding method called Adaptive Padding Early (APE) as part of basket2. APE is designed to be an early implementation of an adaptive padding based defense against website... Read more »

We developed a small tool to calculate the goodput of different basket2 padding methods. The goodput is calculated by parsing the basket2proxy.log and looking for the following line: basket2proxy: 2016/12/19... Read more »

The state-of-the-art website fingerprinting defense is WTF-PAD by Juarez et al. [0]. WTF-PAD stands for Website Traffic Fingerprinting Protection with Adaptive Defense, but yeah, WTF-PAD just has a better ring... Read more »

This is the third evaluation in our series of basket2 evaluation updates (previous at 1 and 2). We use four datasets: 100x100+10,000 gathered week 45 with a local bridge (download... Read more »

At the end of gathering data in our previous post, we ended up with a folder of collected pcaps in the format data/<method>/. Each subfolder has a dataset of 100... Read more »

We’ve updated our data gathering tools to be tailored for gathering datasets with pluggable transports for Tor. While the steps below will be specific to basket2, it should be self-evident... Read more »

Tor Browser version 6.0.6 was released two days ago. When collecting traffic traces for website fingerprinting attacks one wants to avoid network traffic not related to a website visit, since... Read more »

This is our second evaluation of the next generation pluggable transport from the Tor project: basket2. You can find the first evaluation here. Please note that the focus of the... Read more »

For our work on the effect of DNS on Tor’s anonymity we collected a significantly sized DNS dataset with five samples each from the Alexa top one million most popular... Read more »

For our work on the effect of DNS on Tor’s anonymity we collected a significantly sized website fingerprinting dataset with 100 samples of Alexa top 9,000 (monitored sites) and one... Read more »

This post presents an evaluation of a next generation pluggable transport from the Tor project: basket2. The focus of the evaluation is website fingerprinting attacks which is not the primary... Read more »

It’s been dead quiet the last four months here. Our plans changed quickly after the last post, shifting focus to gaining a better understanding of website fingerprinting attacks in more... Read more »

The HOT project has been going for about four months now, and in this post we briefly summarise what has been done so far and the plan for the following... Read more »

In 2014 Wang et al. published the kNN classifier, which is a WF-attack in the form of a supervised machine learning algorithm [0]. The authors kindly provide both the data... Read more »

In the previous post we defined the True Positive Rate (TPR) and False Positive Rate (FPR) in the open world as follows: TPR = TP / monitored elements = TP... Read more »

There are a number of different measurements used in the literature to evaluate the effectiveness of website fingerprinting attacks. This post and the next will attempt to cover most of... Read more »

Website fingerprinting attacks are attacks where a local and passive attacker attempts to identify web pages accessed by a client, despite that the client is using technologies like Tor, SSH... Read more »

HOT is a made-up short for the Swedish project name ‘Hoppet till Tor’, roughly translatable to ‘The hope/jump to Tor’. This project focuses on the first connection from a user’s... Read more »